Even though kidney exchange became an important source of kidney transplants over the last decade with the introduction of market design techniques to organ transplantation, the shortage of kidneys for transplantation is greater than ever. Due to biological disadvantages, patient populations of blood types B/O are disproportionately hurt by this increasing shortage. The disadvantaged blood types are overrepresented among minorities in the US. In order to mitigate the disproportionate harm to these biologically disadvantaged groups, the UNOS reformed in 2014 the US deceased-donor kidney-allocation system, utilizing a technological advance in blood typing. The improved technology allows a certain fraction of blood type A kidneys, referred to as subtype A2 kidneys, to be transplanted to medically qualified patients of blood types B/O. The recent reform prioritizes subtype A2 deceased-donor kidneys for blood type B patients only. When restricted to the deceased-donor allocation system, this is merely a distributional reform with no adverse impact on the overall welfare of the patient population. In this paper we show that the current implementation of the reform has an unintended consequence, and it de facto extends the preferential allocation to kidney exchange as well. Ironically this "spillover" not only reduces the number of living-donor transplants for the overall patient population, but also for the biologically disadvantaged groups who are the intended beneficiaries of * Sönmez acknowledges the research support of Goldman Sachs Gives via the Dalinc Ariburnu -Goldman Sachs Faculty Research Fund. Sönmez and Ünver acknowledge the research support of NSF via award SES #1426440. Yılmaz acknowledges the research support of TÜBİTAK via program 2219. /˜ozyilmaz 1 the reform. We show that minor variations of the current policy do not suffer from this unintended consequence, and we make two easy-to-implement, welfare-increasing policy recommendations.
Introduction
Following a series of collaborations between members of the transplantation community and researchers in market design, kidney exchange became an important source of transplant kidneys over the last decade (cf. Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver, 2004 , 2005 , 2007 . By 2010, transplants from kidney exchanges in the US exceeded 550 (Massie et al., 2013) , which account for about 10 percent of all living-donor kidney transplantations and more than 3 percent of all kidney transplantations. Given the persistent shortage of kidneys for transplantation throughout the world, analysis of policies and procedures that could increase the contribution of kidney exchange to the number of kidney transplants has become an active area of research not only in the transplantation community, but also among the researchers in market design. In this paper we analyze the potential spillovers of a recent policy change in the allocation of deceaseddonor kidneys on the number of transplants from living donors, including those from kidney exchanges. We show that explicit or de facto extension of this policy to kidney exchange can result in a reduction of the number of transplants from living donors (due to a reduction of transplants via exchanges), even though a number of the policy's variants offer great promise to increase the number of transplants. In order to explain the 2014 policy change and its potential effect on the number of living-donor transplants, we give some basic background on transplant immunology.
The most widely used blood type classification is known as the ABO grouping. Under this classification, there are two antigens (antigens A, B) and two antibodies (antibodies anti-A, anti-B) that are responsible for the ABO blood types. The specific combination of these four components determines an individual's blood type. For example, people with type A blood have only the A antigen on the surface of their red cells, and, as a result, they do not produce anti-A antibodies (otherwise they would cause the destruction of their own blood.) Thus, only antibody anti-B is produced by blood type A people. Similarly, blood type B people have antigen B along with antibody anti-A, whereas blood type O people have neither antigen while carrying both antibodies, and blood type AB people have both antigens while carrying neither antibodies.
Blood-type compatibility is a major factor for the successful transplantation of kidneys, and this immunologic asymmetry between different blood types, along with the relative scarcity of type B kidneys for transplantation, has historically resulted in an unfavorable situation for blood type O and B patients. The impact of this imbalance has not been uniform across different ethnicities, and it has especially disadvantaged the African-American patient population, of which nearly 70 percent have blood types O or B.
The above mentioned ABO blood type induced imbalance is well known and well analyzed.
What is less known is that antigen A has two major subtypes, A1 and A2, and different immunologic properties of these subtypes have started to play an important role in the allocation of deceased-donor kidneys in the US since 2014. When donated to type B or O patients, subtype A2 kidneys generate a significantly weaker antibody response than subtype A1 kidneys. 1 The resulting distribution of antibody response in the patient population is such that A2 kidneys can be safely transplanted to more than 80 percent of type B patients and to approximately 30 percent of type O patients (see for example Bryan, 2014; Nelson et al., 2002) . This medical possibility is the basis of a recent policy change in the US to provide greater kidney access to blood type B patients: In 2014, the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) 2 approved a new national deceased-donor kidney-allocation system that preferentially allocates subtype A2 kidneys to type B patients. While both type O and B patients can potentially receive subtype A2 kidneys, the preferential allocation is limited to only type B patients. This has two major reasons:
1. Equity in Access: One of the primary goals of the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) 3 is to increase and ensure the equity of organ sharing in the national system of organ allocation. 4 As we mentioned above, blood type B/O patients have significantly less access to transplant kidneys than blood type A/AB patients. And while both disadvantaged blood types are overrepresented among minorities, a blood type B patient is more likely to be a minority than a blood type O patient. 5 Hence the preferential allocation of subtype A2 deceased-donor kidneys to blood type B pa-tients is a particularly favorable utilization of deceased-donor A2 kidneys for the minority population as a whole, and especially the African-American patient population, which historically had the lowest access to transplant kidneys.
2. Practicality: For a patient to be eligible for a subtype A2 kidney, his antibody anti-A (IgG) titer value should be consistently below a certain threshold over a period of time. 6 Based on this medical criteria, more than 80 percent of type B patients are eligible to receive subtype A2 kidneys. In contrast, only 30/40 percent of type O patients are eligible for subtype A2 kidneys. Hence directing A2 kidneys to B patients requires regular IgG antibody testing for only blood type B patients, who are more likely to be eligible for these kidneys.
Transplants from deceased donors are not the only source of transplant kidneys. Transplants from living donors, directly or via kidney exchanges, are the two other sources. One implication of the preferential allocation of subtype A2 deceased-donor kidneys to blood type B patients is the routine testing of blood type B patients for their titer levels of antibody anti-A. In contrast, antibody anti-A testing is not a routine process for blood type O patients, especially for those who do not have a blood type A donor who may be of subtype A2. This asymmetry between blood type B and O patients results in a de facto extension of the preferential allocation of subtype A2 kidneys to type B patients through kidney exchange as well. That is because, unlike type B patients, type O patients often lack the established antibody anti-A testing history necessary to receive a subtype A2 kidney. 7 Critically, this has an important welfare implication for kidney exchange, unlike for deceased-donor allocation where preferential allocation of subtype A2 kidneys to B patients is mostly a distributional matter. In this paper we show that extending the preferential allocation of A2 kidneys to blood type B patients in kidney exchange not only potentially reduces the total number of living-donor kidney transplants, but also potentially reduces the number of living-donor transplants across all ethnicities, including the most disadvantaged groups such as the African-American patient population. In contrast, making subtype A2 kidneys available to patients with type B or O blood unambiguously benefits patients of all ethnicities. This improvement simply requires establishing an antibody 6 A threshold of 1:8 shall be maintained in the US for the 6 months before the transplant (for example, see Nelson and Bryan, 2010) . 7 For example, the operational guidelines of the UNOS National Kidney Exchange Pilot Program allow the possibility of A2-to-O transplants (Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 2016) , and such compatibility is treated no differently than A2/A2B-to-B transplants in exchanges, unlike in the new UNOS deceased-donor allocation policy. However, because extended O patient anti-A antibody titer testing is not practiced and such histories are not available as noted above, the national program's policy is de facto A2-to-B compatibility.
anti-A titer level history for blood type O patients as in the case of blood type B patients who already have their levels tested to potentially benefit from the preferential allocation of subtype A2 kidneys under the national deceased-donor kidney-allocation system.
Increasingly, economists are taking advantage of advances in technology to design new or improved allocation mechanisms in practical applications as diverse as entry-level labor markets (Roth and Peranson, 1999) , spectrum auctions (Milgrom, 2000) , school choice (Balinski and Sönmez, 1999; Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003) , course allocation (Sönmez and Ünver, 2010; Budish and Cantillon, 2012) , affirmative action (Kojima, 2012; Hafalır, Yenmez, and Yıldırım, 2013; Echenique and Yenmez, 2015) , bone marrow registry (Bergstrom, Garratt, and Sheehan-Connor, 2009 ), cadet-branch matching (Sönmez and Switzer, 2013; Sönmez, 2013) , refugee matching (Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport, 2014; Jones and Teytelboym, 2015) , and assignment of arrival slots (Schummer and Vohra, 2013; Abizada and Schummer, 2013) . Our paper contributes to the emerging field of market design by bringing to light a potential unintended consequence of the 2014 US deceased-donor allocation reform in the form of a reduction in the number of living-donor transplants, and by making easy-to-implement welfare-enhancing policy recommendations to avoid this potential loss.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, we discuss the formation of the kidney-exchange pool with special emphasis on the impact of various blood typing/subtying technologies on the formation of the pool. In Section 3, we build on the theoretical model of Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver (2007) to analyze the impact of availability and timing of various blood subtyping technologies on the number of living-donor kidney transplants. In Section 5, we drop these assumptions and show via computational simulations that all our theoretical results are verified using kidney-donation data from the US. In Section 6, we conclude. The Appendix is devoted to proofs (Appendix A), the extended analysis allowing for 3-way kidney exchange in addition to 2-way exchange (Appendix B), additional results related to simulations (Appendix C). 
Tissue-Type Compatibility
Of the two potential medical barriers to transplantation, tissue-type incompatibility (a.k.a.
"positive crossmatch") is the less structured one, and it has to do with the patient having preformed antibodies against one or more of the donor's human leukocyte antigen (HLA) proteins.
Antibodies can arise from exposure to foreign proteins, e.g., through prior transplants, blood transfusions, or even childbirth. (Consequently, mothers are less likely to be compatible with a kidney from the father of their children than from a random donor from the same population.)
The positive crossmatch probability between a random patient-donor pair is relatively low, with a mean probability of less than 15 percent (see, for example, Zenios, Woodle, and Ross, 2001) , although this probability is not uniform across all patients.
Blood-Type Compatibility
Blood-type compatibility is the more structured of the two primary medical requirements for kidney transplantation. The standard blood type classification is known as ABO grouping.
Under this classification there are two types of red blood cell proteins (or antigens) referred to as antigen A and antigen B. An individual can have any combination of these two antigens, and individuals produce antibodies against the antigens they lack. There are four blood types determined by the presence or absence of these two antigens on the surface of red blood cells:
1. Blood type O: Has neither A nor B antigens on red cells (but both antibody anti-A and antibody anti-B are in the plasma).
2. Blood type A: Has only the A antigen on red cells (and antibody anti-B in the plasma).
3. Blood type B: Has only the B antigen on red cells (and antibody anti-A in the plasma).
Blood type AB: Has both A and B antigens on red cells (but neither antibody anti-A nor
antibody anti-B in the plasma).
The above-described blood type classification induces the standard ABO blood-type compatibility, or simply ABO compatibility where:
• blood type O patients can receive a kidney only from blood type O donors,
• blood type A patients can receive a kidney from blood type A and O donors,
• blood type B patients can receive a kidney from blood type B and O donors, and
• blood type AB patients can receive a kidney from all donors.
We will treat ABO compatibility as the baseline technology that determines the kidney-exchange pool along with tissue-type compatibility.
The immunologic asymmetry under ABO compatibility has historically resulted in an unfavorable situation for blood type O patients in the form of less access to transplant kidneys compared to blood type A or AB patients. In addition to blood type O patients, blood type B patients are also biologically disadvantaged because they are more likely to suffer from kidney disease. In part due to this uneven access to transplant kidneys under the ABO-compatibility technology, a more refined classification of blood types has started to play an important role in the allocation of deceased-donor kidneys in the US since 2014. In addition to the baseline ABO-compatibility technology, we also consider the three subtyping technologies A2-to-B compatibility, A2-to-O compatibility, and full compatibility, described in Section 2.3. When available, a subtyping technology will replace the baseline ABOcompatibility technology, thereby potentially removing a barrier to direct donation. Therefore compared to the baseline ABO compatibility, the availability of each of the three subtyping technologies will potentially extend the set of patients who receive a transplant via direct donation and potentially shrink the set of patients who are transferred to the kidney-exchange pool.
Blood Subtype A2/A2B Compatibility
A 2-way kidney exchange involves two patients, each of whom is compatible with the other patient's donor. When a 2-way exchange is carried out, both patients receive a kidney from the other patient's donor. Once the kidney-exchange pool forms under any of the abovedescribed bloodtyping/subtyping technologies, a maximal-size kidney exchange is determined for the given pool of incompatible patient donor pairs as in Ünver (2005, 2007) . Our focus is to analyze the impact of availability of various subtyping technologies on the total number of living-donor transplants, including direct transplants from patients' compatible donors and transplants from kidney exchanges.
Following Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver (2007) , we rely on the following three assumptions about the composition of the kidney-exchange pool to derive our analytical results. While these assumptions are used for our analytical results, they will be dispensed with in our simulations in Section 5. We will observe that all qualitative implications of our analytical results are verified by our simulations in the absence of these assumptions. We next motivate and formally state these assumptions.
Let X, Y be two distinct blood types such that a blood type Y donor can donate to a blood type X patient. Being blood-type compatible, a pair of type X-Y is only transferred to the kidney-exchange pool when the pair is tissue-type incompatible, a relatively rare event.
In contrast, a pair of the opposite type Y-X is always transferred to the kidney-exchange pool because they are blood-type incompatible. Therefore, in the long run, there will be an abundance of Y-X pairs in the kidney-exchange pool in comparison with X-Y pairs, and thus it will not be possible to match all pairs of type Y-X. 8 We refer to this situation as a pair of type Y-X being on the long side of the exchange. This simple observation, which is also empirically observed throughout the world in kidney-exchange programs, is the basis of our first assumption.
Assumption 1 (Large Population Assumption (LP)): Our next assumption is based on the following empirical observation for the US: The frequency of types A-B and B-A are 0.05 and 0.03 respectively (Terasaki, Gjertson, and Cecka, 1998) .
Assumption 2 (Type Frequencies Assumption (TF)): There are more type A-B pairs than type B-A pairs.
While patients can have tissue-type incompatibility with their own donors, to establish an upper bound on the number of possible transplants we will assume that they are tissue-type compatible with other donors. In the same spirit, we will assume that all blood type B patients are qualified to receive subtype A2/A2B kidneys, and all blood type O patients are qualified to receive subtype A2 kidneys.
Assumption 3 (Upper-Bound Assumption (UB)):
(i) No patient is tissue-type incompatible with another patient's donor.
(ii) Each patient in the exchange pool has an IgG antibody titer value less than 1:8.
When we later dispense with this assumption in our simulations, we will see that, in large pools, this assumption is not very consequential. The reason is that, although a patient who is tissue-type incompatible with his own donor will likely have positive crossmatches with some other patients' donors also, in a sufficiently large pool there will also be many donors with whom he has no tissue-type incompatibility. 9 Similarly, while many blood type B or O patients will have high antibody anti-A (IgG) titer values that disqualify them from receiving subtype A2/A2B kidneys, there will also be many patients on the long side of the market who can receive those kidneys instead. For any nonnegative number k, let k denote the integer part of k, i.e., the greatest integer no larger than k. Given a set T , let odd T be equal to 1 if the cardinality of T is odd, and 0 if it is even. We first consider the impact of replacing the ABO-compatibility technology with the A2to-B subtyping technology. As we argued in Section 2.3, A2-to-B technology is a good approximation of the present implementation of the blood type A subtyping technology, and thus our 9 As in our simulations, in a model where tissue-type incompatibility is determined through a fixed probability between each patient and donor, this is a consequence of the well-known Erdös and Rényi (1960) theorem when the size of the exchange pool is sufficiently large.
Analytical Results under 2-way Exchange
first comparative statics exercise captures the de facto impact of the 2014 policy reform on the number of living-donor kidney transplants. One might be tempted to presume that removing a barrier to transplantation through utilization of a new and improved technology will necessarily increase the number of living-donor transplants. As our first comparative-statics exercise shows, this is not necessarily the case. 
Observe that Λ is negligible in a large pool, and the very low frequency of subtype A2B individuals in the population implies that the de facto practiced A2-to-B subtyping technology is there is no net benefit to members of type B-A, but there is a net harm to members of the opposite type A-B.
In our second comparative-statics exercise, we consider the impact of replacing the ABOcompatibility technology with the A2-to-O subtyping technology. As we argue in Section 2.3, A2-to-O subtyping technology corresponds to a hypothetical scenario where antibody anti-A titer value testing becomes routine for blood type O patients but not for blood type B patients.
The impact of this hypothetical scenario is in striking contrast with the detrimental impact of the current de facto implementation of A2-to-B subtyping technology. 
Unlike the detrimental impact of the A2-to-B subtyping technology on the composition of the kidney-exchange pool, the A2-to-O subtyping technology improves it. That happens both through curbing the number of type O-A pairs that are on the long side of the exchange while at the same time increasing their matching possibilities by adding the set of (A − A2) x pairs to their potential matches.
Our first two results have an important policy implication on the welfare effects of integrating blood type A subtyping technology to an exchange: Under the current protocol of subtype testing by hospitals, A2-to-B compatibility technology leads to a reduction in the number of transplants, whereas the counterfactual A2-to-O compatibility technology leads to an increase.
This observation points to a crucial difference between deceased donation and kidney exchange.
While the preferential allocation of subtype A2 deceased-donor kidneys to blood type B patients is only a distributional matter, directly or indirectly extending the same policy to kidney exchange has a detrimental effect on the overall welfare of the patient population. In our simulations we show that this detrimental effect on patient welfare is not restricted to specific ethnic groups but rather shared across all ethnicities, including those who are meant to benefit from the preferential allocation of subtype A2 kidneys to blood type B patients.
In the context of 2-way exchange, the effect of A2-to-B compatibility on direct donation and that of A2-to-O compatibility are mutually exclusive. Similarly, the sets of pairs affected in exchange by A2-to-B compatibility and by A2-to-O compatibility are mutually exclusive. Thus, the effect of replacing ABO compatibility with full compatibility on the number of living-donor transplants is simply the direct sum of the individual effects of these two subtyping technologies, resulting in the following easy result.
Proposition 3 Assume LP(i), LP(iv), TF, UB. Consider the 2-way-exchange policy. If the compatibility technology changes from ABO compatibility to full compatibility, then (i) the number of transplants via direct donation increases by
(ii) the number of transplants via exchange changes by
(iii) the total number of transplants changes by
The term Θ+Λ is negligible in a large pool, and blood type B has lower representation in the population than both blood type A and blood type O. Thus, the net welfare effect of replacing 
(ii) the number of transplants via exchange increases by
(iii) the total number of transplants increases by
The key observation for Proposition 4 is that the de facto practiced A2-to-B subtyping technology is no longer detrimental to living-donor kidney transplantation once utilization of 10 The problem of maximizing the total number of transplants via direct transplants and 2-way exchanges in a kidney-exchange pool that includes compatible pairs is studied in Sönmez and Ünver (2014) .
the subtyping technology is deferred until after the formation of the kidney-exchange pool. This is, of course, expected because the removal of a barrier to direct transplantation can only decrease the number of living-donor transplants through an unfavorable effect on the composition of the kidney-exchange pool.
We next consider the impact of replacing the ABO-compatibility technology with the A2- 
Recall that unlike the A2-to-B subtyping technology, utilization of the A2-to-O subtyping technology does not affect the composition of the kidney-exchange pool in an unfavorable way.
As such, deferral of the subtyping tests only marginally affects the number of living-donor transplants through the residual term Θ under this technology.
We finally consider the impact of replacing the ABO-compatibility technology with full- 
The key takeaway in this section is that, with the deferred timing of the blood type A sub- 
Simulations
In this section, we report the results of simulations using the US patient statistics obtained from OPTN database to demonstrate the magnitudes of potential welfare benefits and harms of subtype A2 matching with B or O patients in an exchange under a number of different scenarios.
Simulation Setup
In each simulation, we randomly generate n non-blood related patient-donor pairs as follows: Frequencies of low, medium, and high PRA patients reported in the OPTN database are given in Table 1 . A more detailed PRA distribution is unavailable in the medical literature.
Thus, we assume that:
• each low-PRA patient has a tissue-type incompatibility probability of 5 percent with a random donor,
• each medium-PRA patient has a tissue-type incompatibility probability of 45 percent with a random donor, and
• each high-PRA patient has a tissue-type incompatibility probability of 90 percent with a random donor.
After the pool of incompatible patient-donor pairs is determined, these pairs become eligible for exchange.
We consider seven simulation scenarios differentiated across three dimensions:
1. Under ABO compatibility: This is the baseline scenario and identical to exchange with incompatible pairs.
US Races
White Black Asian Amer. Pacific Indian Island. shows the cell direction, along the column or row entries, adding up to frequency 100 percent.
For the Bernoulli distributions of D, F.1, and F.2, the alternative event and its probability are omitted for brevity.
2. Under subtype A2 compatibility: These six scenarios correspond to the cases in our analytical analysis and are grouped across two dimensions, the timing of blood type A subtype testing and the subtype A2 compatibility technology used:
(a) Timing of the subtyping tests is before joining the kidney-exchange pool: We consider the three subtyping technologies we considered in our theoretical analysis, (i) A2-to-B compatibility, (ii) A2-to-O compatibility, and (iii) full compatibility.
(b) Timing of the subtyping tests is after joining the kidney-exchange pool: We consider the three technologies, (i) A2-to-B compatibility, (ii) A2-to-O compatibility, and (iii) full compatibility.
We consider two different exchange technologies for these 7 simulation scenarios: Optimal 2-way and optimal 2&3-way exchange. 13,14
Simulation Results
We run S = 500 2-way-exchange simulations and report the results as averages and sample standard deviations in Table 2 . 15
Under A2-to-B compatibility when subtyping tests are conducted before joining the pool, the average number of transplants achievable through 2-way exchange (and direct donation if needed) decreases from Scenario 1 -the exchange practice under ABO compatibility only -to Scenario 2(a)i -the de facto exchange policy with A2 compatibility -as predicted by Proposition 1. This decrease is statistically significant with a paired t-test for degrees of freedom 499 with t-statistic 4.3366 that leads to a p-value less than 10 −5 .
We also document how the effect of this transition is shared across patients of different ethnic backgrounds (see Table 3 ). We observe that for whites, there is a decrease, which is statistically significant (with a paired t-test p-value of less than 10 −5 ). For blacks, Asians, and Pacific islanders, there is a slight decrease, for American Indians, there is a slight increase, none of which are statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
The direction of other changes across all treatments are in accordance with the theoretical results of Section 4, as seen in Table 2 . In particular, the average number of transplants 13 For 2-way exchange simulations we use n = 2000 as the sample size. On the other hand, because determining a maximal 2&3-way matching is an NP-complete problem, we use a sample size of n = 500 instead of 2000. 14 In our simulations, to find the maximum number of patients who can benefit from an exchange (for both 2-way and 2&3-way exchange) we use the CPLEX integer-programming software. We refer the reader to the Appendix of Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver (2007) for the formulation of the optimal exchange problem as an integer program. When compatible pairs are also included in exchange for scenarios 2(b)i-iii, the formulation stands.
However, all feasible single-pair cycles are also included in 2-way and 2&3-way exchange integer program. 15 In Appendix C, we report the results of simulations for 2&3-way technology in Tables 4, 5, and 7. significantly increases from Scenario 1 and 2(a)i to 2(a)ii and 2(a)iii (cf. Proposition 2), while there is a significant decrease from Scenario 2(a)ii to 2(a)iii (cf. Proposition 3). The same pattern is true for all races (see Table 3 ). This corresponds to a 13.74 percent increase from A2-to-B compatibility to A2-to-O compatibility (from Scenario 2(a)i to 2(a)ii). Moreover, when the A2 subtype transplantation is done uncoordinated with exchange before the exchange participation decision, even full compatibility brings a substantial decrease to the number of transplants: a 2 percent decrease is observed in the number of transplants with respect to A2-to-O compatibility (from Scenario 2(a)ii to 2(a)iii).
When the subtyping tests are conducted after joining the exchange pool, the corresponding numbers of transplants increase with respect to the cases when subtyping tests are conducted before joining the pool (the signs and statistical significance of differences across scenarios are as predicted by the theoretical results). What is striking is that the maximum average number of transplants under optimal 2-way exchange and live donation (Scenario 2(b)iii), i.e., the maximum achievable, is not too much different (although the increase is highly statistically significant) from the A2-to-O compatibility scenario with subtyping before joining the pool (Scenario 2(a)ii): the difference is only 0.7 percent. If A2-to-B compatibility could totally be eliminated for live donation and we could only use A2-to-O compatibility, even if we could not defer subtype testing until pairs join the exchange pool, we would lose very little with respect to the optimal policy recommendation. This result also holds across all race groups.
2&3-way simulations are very similar, as reported in Tables 4 and 5 16 We also report how different pair types are affected by different scenarios in Appendix C in Table 6 for 2-way exchange and A kidneys, referred to as subtype A2, are preferentially allocated to blood type B patients with sufficiently low antibody titer levels. Preferential allocation of subtype A2 kidneys is restricted to blood type B patients, in part to give the highest potential benefit to minority patients. This is consistent with the primary goal of the OPTN, as formally stated in the federal Final Rule
The primary goal of the OPTN is to increase and ensure the effectiveness, efficiency, and equity of organ sharing in the national system of organ allocation, and to increase the supply of donated organs available for transplantation.
When restricted to allocation of deceased-donor kidneys, preferential allocation of subtype A2 kidneys is only a distributional policy choice and does not conflict with the OPTN's dual goal of efficiency.
In this paper, we argue that the specific implementation of this policy in the US de facto extends the preferential allocation to kidney exchange as well. That happens because a 6-month history of sufficiently low antibody anti-A titer value is required for a blood type B or O patient to safely receive a subtype A2 transplant. And this history is presently established for blood type B patients so that they can potentially benefit from the preferential allocation system.
In contrast, a blood type O patient typically lacks this required history, thus rendering him ineligible for subtype A2 kidneys in the kidney-exchange pool for at least 6 months. Critically, extending the preferential allocation to kidney exchange results in a welfare loss in the patient population, not only compared to alternative utilizations of this technology, but even compared to a baseline scenario where the improved subtyping technology is unavailable. We show in our simulations that this loss is not restricted to the population of white patients, but shared across all ethnic groups.
Avoiding the above mentioned welfare loss is not difficult. We promote two adjustments in the current practice to improve the welfare of the patient population. The easier adjustment simply requires systematic establishment of antibody anti-A titer value history for blood type O patients as well as blood type B patients. That simple adjustment breaks the de facto extension of the preferential allocation to kidney exchange. That adjustment alone, however, is not sufficient to create an optimal utilization of the subtyping technology. As a second adjustment, we promote the utilization of the subtyping technology only after blood/tissue-type-incompatible pairs join a kidney-exchange pool. This second adjustment affects the composition of the kidney-exchange pool in a favorable way and results in a further increase in the number of living-donor kidney transplants consistent with the efficiency goal of the OPTN. The health insurance system can potentially play a role in the second adjustment by encouraging blood type A subtyping tests to be conducted at kidney-exchange programs rather than at hospitals on initial arrival.
Appendix A Proofs of Section 4
We start this appendix with a result from Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver (2007) stating the maximum number of transplants when A-subtype compatibility is not considered. This is good to have as a benchmark result before proving further results:
Lemma 1 (Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver, 2007) Suppose LP(i), TF, and UB(i) hold. Consider 2-way exchange under regular ABO compatibility. The maximum number of pairs that can be matched via exchange is
The intuition behind this result is that: This intuition for different types of mutual-compatibility graphs was first formalized by Gallai (1963 Gallai ( , 1964 and Edmonds (1965) , and generalized to situations with compatible pairs joining the exchange pool by Sönmez and Ünver (2014) (as in our scenarios in Section 4.2). We use this result directly or indirectly in our proofs. To state the relevant part of this result for our proofs, first we formalize two additional concepts. We refer to a matching that maximizes the number of patients receiving transplants as a maximal matching. A pair is underdemanded if there exists a maximal matching in which the patient of the pair does not receive a transplant.
We state the lemma we use as follows:
Lemma 2 (Gallai-Edmonds decomposition (GED) with possible compatible pairs) (Sönmez and Ünver, 2014) In each maximal matching under 2-way-exchange policy, each pair, which is not underdemanded and is mutually compatible with an underdemanded pair, is matched with an underdemanded pair.
We prove our results as follows:
Proof of Proposition 1. compatibility changes by the following number: On the other hand, the increase in the number of transplants via exchange due to B-A2B pairs is captured by the following term:
To holds here as well, and the term capturing the increase in the number of direct donations is as follows:
Similarly, the increase in the number of transplants via exchange due to O-A2 pairs is given by the following term:
The proof for residual term in the proposition follows from the same argument as in Proposition 4.
Appendix B 2&3-way Exchanges: Analytical Results
We analyze the effects of different subtyping technologies on the number of transplants when (not only 2-way exchanges but also) 3-way exchanges are feasible. 17 Before our analysis, we restate a result from Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver (2007) regarding the number of transplants when no A subtyping technology is available:
Lemma 3 (Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver, 2007) Suppose LP(i), TF, and UB(i) hold. Consider 2-way and 3-way exchange under regular ABO compatibility. The maximum number of pairs that can be matched via exchange is
The intuition behind this result is as follows: This number is different from the number given in We extend this rationale to A2 compatibility scenarios by making use of the underdemanded pairs defined for 2-way exchange analysis.
The outline of our analysis in this appendix is as follows: First, we analyze the efficiency implications of blood subtyping technology under the current implementation of blood subtype tests (Appendix B.1). Second, we consider these implications under the change in timing of subtype tests (Appendix B.2).
We define ∆, which we use throughout this appendix, as follows: Case 1: 
Note that this equal to ∆. 
Proof. (i) The increase in the number of transplants via direct donation is the sum of the terms in part (i) of Propositions 7 and 8. This follows directly from the argument in part (i) of the proofs of these results. 19 We assume that under ABO compatibility, an Case 1: Suppose 0 < ∆ < #(AB − A2) x . By the same argument, as in Case 2 of Proposition 8, the number of transplants increases by ∆. Thus, under full compatibility, the number of transplants increases by ∆. Because the other exchanges are not affected by the timing of the tests, the result follows. 
Appendix C Remaining Simulation Results
Averages and standard deviations of S = 500 simulations with n = 500 pairs 2&3-way exchanges 
